This paper analyzes the performance of collusion attacks on random fingerprinting codes, when the colluders are subject to an almostsure squared distortion constraint and a list decoder is used. We derive an exact characterization of the type-I and type-II error exponents of the fingerprinting system. A Gaussian ensemble and an expurgated Gaussian ensemble of codes are considered, and the corresponding random-coding exponents are derived. Explicit optimal strategies for the colluders are derived as well.
INTRODUCTION
Digital fingerprinting systems can be used for traitor tracing or digital rights management applications. A length-N realvalued signal is to be protected and distributed to M users. Some of the users (K of them) may collude and process their copies to create a forgery that contains only weak traces of their fingerprints. This problem was first posed by Cox et al. [1] who proposed the use of Gaussian fingerprints for this purpose. Specifically, their fingerprints were drawn randomly from an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution; the fingerprint code is shared with the decoder but not revealed to the users.
A fundamental question is what are the optimal performance limits for detection of colluders. To make the problem nontrivial, one may assume embedding distortion constraints on the fingerprinter and the colluders. Example of this analysis include [2, 3] for the case of signals defined over finite alphabets, and [4, 5] for the case of real-valued signals. In the latter case, an obvious (but not necessarily optimal) strategy for the colluders is to perform a uniform linear average of their copies and add i.i.d. Gaussian noise; this strategy was examined in the above papers. Possible improvements for the attackers consist of developing (nonlinear) order-statistics attacks [6, 7] .
Our study aims at developing a comprehensive detectiontheoretic analysis of collusion attacks and identifying an optimal strategy for the colluders. The analysis is rooted in largedeviations theory. Initial results were reported in [8, 9] . In This research was supported in part by NSF grant CCR 03-25924. this paper some of the restrictive assumptions in [8, 9] are relaxed, including the assumption that the noise introduced by the colluders is white and Gaussian. We also use a list decoder that returns a list of guilty users.
We consider two random ensembles of fingerprinting codes. The first one is the same as the one used by Cox [1] and other researchers and is shown to be less performant than the second one, which is an expurgated ensemble (bad codes are eliminated). The decoder has access to a forgery as well as to the host signal (nonblind detection) and performs a binary hypothesis test on each user to determine whether that user was involved in the forgery. The cost functions in this problem are the maximum type-I and type-Il probabilities of error, which the colluders want to maximize.
Throughout this paper, we use boldface uppercase letters to denote random vectors, uppercase letters for the components of the vectors, and calligraphic fonts for sets. We use the symbol E to denote mathematical expectation. For any collection of vectors {xI, ... , XM}, we denote by xK = {xk, k C JC} the restriction of this collection to its components k C /. The 
PROBLEM STATEMENT
The mathematical setup of the problem is diagrammed in Fig. 1. 
Fingerprint Generation and Embedding
The host signal is a sequence S = (S (1) 
Attack Model
Denote by K C {1, 2,. , M} the coalition, i.e., the index set of the colluding users. Their coalition has cardinality K < M. They select a conditional pdf A (YI Xk) and draw a pirated copy, or forgery, Y EC RN, from that distribution. We write Y A(XKc).
(
Consider the following constraints on the attack channel A.
(Al) Location-Invariant constraint:
(A2) Almost-Sure Mean-Squared Distortion constraint:
for all permutations wF of the index set /.
The model (Al) precludes attacks involving filtering of host signal components. The motivation for this restriction is that it considerably simplifies the mathematical derivation and does not require a statistical model for the host S. The restriction is relatively mild if embedding is done in a transform domain in which the components of the host S are approximately independent and are large relative to the embedding distortion. The motivation for (A2) is that distortion is best measured relative to the host S, but S is not known to the coalition, so we replace S by its best linear unbiased estimate, K ZkCk Xk-Choosing an expected distortion constraint of the form E IIY -S 2 < ND, would allow impulsive noise strategies which blast iid additive noise AF(O, NDC) with probability 1 N. Such attacks are extremely effective [10] as they result in zero error exponents. Finally, the fairness condition (A3) will not be imposed but will be shown to hold for optimal attacks: all members of the coalition incur the same risk.
A special case of (1) that will be of interest is
where the noise E is independent of XK and uniformly distributed on the N -K dimensional centered sphere with radius Noa contained in the N-K dimensional hyperplane orthogonal to the coalition vectors Xk, k C /. The 
This condition is satisfied by various nonlinear mappings including order-statistics mappings [8] . A special case is uniform linear averaging,
The model studied in [9] was of the form (2) , but E was AWGN with mean zero and variance ae.
When the attack is of the form (2), we need ao2 < DC to satisfy the distortion constraint (A2). Hence ae2 is maximized (made equal to Dc) by letting fN be the uniform linear averaging mapping of (4).
'When K > 2, the model (2) is more restrictive than (1), even if E is unconstrained. For instance a mixture of models of the form (2) (3) satisfies (1) and (Ai) but generally not (2).
Decoder
We study the nonblind scenario where the host signal S is available at the decoder and can be subtracted from Y, to form the centered data Y -S. The decoder computes a guilt index for each user m and returns the list of users whose guilt index exceeds a certain threshold NT. The guilt index adopted here is the correlation statistic Tm(y -s) = u(y -s) = u [fN(uk) + e]. (5) The decoder (5) does not know the channel A used by the colluders or even the exact number K of colluders. However the decoder knows Kmax, the maximum number of colluders. For any given user m, the possible error events are a false positive (incorrectly declaring the user to be guilty) or a false negative (incorrectly declaring the user to be innocent). (6) is due to the union bound. Detection is said to be reliable if (6) and (7) Proof: immediate consequence of Props. 1, 2, and (6), (7).
EXPURGATED GAUSSIAN ENSEMBLE
The problem with the Gaussian ensemble W of Sec. 4 is that error probability (which is obtained by averaging over all codes in W) may be dominated by bad codes. This is a standard problem for the design of low-rate codes, for which performance is dictated by minimum-distance considerations, and the bad codes are the ones with poor minimum distance [12] . Improvements can be obtained by using expurgation, i.e., removing bad codes from the random ensemble. We apply this principle to our fingerprinting problem and show that performance can indeed be improved by expurgating the Gaussian random ensemble. We assume here that Kmax nM < N.
To gain some insight, we first consider the case M = K + 1 with fixed f and K (the simplest possible extension of the two-codeword problem of [12, Ch. 5] 
EN (14) Lemma 3 The probability that a code C drawn from the iid Gaussian ensemble also belongs to W tends to ] as N -) oc.
By application of this lemma, the following procedure may be used to draw a code from W: draw C from the iid Gaussian ensemble and verify whether C satisfies (12, (13) 
